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I. Introduction
"In order to form a more perfect union."'
The struggle for equality and freedom is a thread running
through all of American history. Since the 1970s, gay civil
rights and, more specifically, same sex marriage, have been
hotly contested legal and social issues.2 In 1996, Congress
spoke directly to those issues in a vote that cut across party
lines; an overwhelming majority of the House and Senate
agreed to pass the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which has
the stated purpose of "defin[ing] and protect[ing] the institution
of marriage."3 The Act defines "marriage" as the union between
a man and a woman for the purposes of interpreting federal
laws and provides that no state, territory or possession of the
United States can be compelled to recognize any law of another
state that treats same sex relationships as "marriages."4 This
Act effectively changed the character of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Constitution without a corresponding
amendment. President Clinton signed it into law without de-
lay.5 Several states followed suit by amending their family rela-
tions laws or adding new statutory provisions to prevent
homosexuals from marrying.6
Vermont was the first state in the union to provide for legal
recognition of same sex unions. 7 In 1999, Vermont's legislature
enacted the civil unions statute8 in response to a Vermont Su-
preme Court decision holding that the state's constitution re-
quired an extension of marital benefits to same sex unions.9
1. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
2. Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Marriage Between Persons of the Same
Sex, 81 A.L.R. 5th 1, 2 (2002).
3. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
4. Id. § 7.
5. Peter Baker, President Quietly Signs Law Aimed at Gay Marriages, WASH.
POST, Sept. 22, 1996, at A21.
6. Alaska, Arkansas, and Georgia are just a few of the states with laws explic-
itly preventing same sex marriage. ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (Michie 2003); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-11-109 (Michie 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 190303.1 (2002).
7. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
8. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-07 (2003).
9. Baker, 744 A.2d 864.
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Many states have since refused to honor the civil unions certi-
fied in Vermont, citing DOMA as an exception to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, which might otherwise require them to rec-
ognize such unions.' 0 State courts have also used cases present-
ing the question of the legal effect of same sex unions and their
dissolution outside Vermont to expound on the immorality of
those unions, or on their state's legislative policy against such
unions, or both." On the other hand, a few states began to de-
bate whether to enact civil unions laws of their own.12 In the
face of what they perceived as the growing push for the recogni-
tion of same sex marriage, special interest groups rallied to pre-
vent the states from enacting more civil unions laws.
In 2001, the Alliance for Marriage Organization drafted an
amendment to the Constitution in response to attempts by liti-
gants to use Full Faith and Credit in order to force sister states
to recognize Vermont civil unions.13 Representative Ronnie
Shows, a Mississippi Democrat, sponsored this proposed
amendment and brought it to the House, where it was promptly
co-sponsored by twenty-one more Representatives. 4 The pro-
posed amendment, entitled the "Federal Marriage Amend-
ment," 5 is the latest in a long line of unconstitutional
legislation perpetuating civil rights abuse and discrimination in
America.
Courts addressing the issue of same sex marriage have al-
most overwhelmingly agreed that it is not a violation of the
Constitution or American tradition to forbid same sex mar-
riages.' 6 This article will demonstrate how American history,
the Constitution, its underpinnings and legislative history, to-
gether with long standing legal precedent require state and fed-
eral recognition of gay marriages. The history of the United
States as included here is not, nor is it intended to be, exhaus-
10. See, e.g., Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 1.
11. See infra note 133.
12. This year Massachusetts became the first state to recognize gay marriage.
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003).
13. Federal Marriage Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 93, 107th Cong. (2002), availa-
ble at http://www.allianceformarriage.org/reports/fma/amendment.htm (July 12,
2001) (on file with author).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See infra note 136.
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tive. Rather, I will use parts of American history to illustrate
the general principle that the American ideal is freedom; that
the American dream is liberty and justice for all.
II. Foreshadowing
"Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains." 7
"Give me liberty or give me death."'
The American dream has always been a dream of freedom.
Since the beginning, this New World has drawn to itself those
who would live free. 19 In 1776, after massive civil unrest,
Thomas Jefferson's Declaration of Independence was signed,
thereby separating the colonies from the rule of the British. It
began, "WE hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all men
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
and the Pursuit of Happiness." 20 The new American govern-
ment would, Thomas Jefferson explained, secure those unalien-
able rights.2' According to Jefferson, securing those rights was
the purpose of all government and any government of a free
people derived its "just powers [only] from the consent of the
governed."22
In 1787, delegates from twelve of the thirteen states finally
met in Philadelphia to create a union out of thirteen sovereigns
by creating a central government strong enough to govern and
yet unable to impinge on the freedoms that the colonists had
just fought to protect.23 In 1788, a majority of the states ratified
the new Constitution and it became the supreme law of the
17. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract, or Principles of Political
Right, in CLASSICS OF MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 909 (Michael L. Morgan ed.,
2d ed. 1996) (1992).
18. Patrick Henry, Speech delivered to the Virginia House of Delegates, Rich-
mond, Va., (Mar. 23, 1775), in 2 ANNALS OF AMERICA 321 (1968).
19. "Bear in mind this sacred principle, that though the will of the majority is
in all cases to prevail, that will to be rightful must be reasonable; that the minority
possess their equal rights, which equal law must protect, and to violate would be
oppression." PETER MCWILLIAMS, AIN'T NOBODY'S BUSINESS IF You Do 269 (Jean
Sedillos ed., 1993) (quoting Thomas Jefferson, 1801).
20. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. RALPH MITCHELL, CQ's GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 25 (2d ed. 1986).
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land.24 In 1791, the first ten amendments, which were crucial
to the states' acceptance of the Constitution, were ratified.
They secured from tyranny the most basic and most fundamen-
tal rights of a free people such as freedom of religion, a free
press, freedom of speech, freedom to be secure in one's person
and possessions, and the right to due process.25
From its ratification, the Bill of Rights has been treated
with utmost reverence. The courts carefully scrutinize statutes
that touch it, or are perceived as doing So. 26 No amendment has
yet been passed that abridges the "unalienable rights" con-
tained in the Bill of Rights. The Federal Marriage Amendment
would be the first to contract these natural, fundamental rights,
which are not created by law but are, according to the Founders,
inherent in all people. It is to secure such rights that "Govern-
ments are instituted among Men .... ,,27
III. Philosophical Underpinnings
"Liberty is the only thing you cannot have unless you are will-
ing to give it to others. "28
In 1969, in New York City, decades of state sponsored op-
pression of homosexuals exploded in the Stonewall Riot, where
"gays fought back during a police raid of the [Stonewall] bar" in
Greenwich Village.29 Since this time, the gay rights movement
has fought openly for the equal rights of gay Americans. This
movement was not the first of its kind to sweep America, nor
was it the first of its kind to confront the discrimination and
hatred entrenched in American society. Long before Stonewall,
both the women's and black civil rights movements battled for
equal rights and a return to the traditional American values of
liberty and justice for all.
24. Id. at 28.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. I, amend. IV, amend. V.
26. See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (discussing an Ala-
bama law that infringed upon the First Amendment).
27. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
28. MCWILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 32 (quoting Williams Allen White).
29. LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAw 202 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993).
2003] 305
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A. The Black Civil Rights Movement
The Declaration of Independence, precursor to these united
states and the heart of American political philosophy, states
that "all men are created equal,"30 yet America is no stranger to
hatred or discrimination. After a war based, ostensibly, on lib-
erty, the revolutionaries created a government whose purpose
was to "form a more perfect Union"31 and secure for the people
their "unalienable Rights."32 Despite the espoused values of
this new government, an entire group of Americans remained in
chains.
Formal slavery tarnished two hundred years of American
history and its effects linger on to this day. Slaves were
stripped of every natural right. They had no liberty and no
property. Rather, they were property.33 The law failed to pro-
tect their very lives. Families were split and sold apart.3 4 Rape,
assault, and murder were commonplace. 35 For example, in Vir-
ginia in 1748 a statute provided "[a]n accidental homicide dur-
ing correction of a slave does not make one liable for prosecution
or punishment ... "36 Laws that protected whites did not apply
to blacks.3 7 Criminal laws treated them much more harshly
than they treated whites. 38 "In fact, any education of Negroes
was forbidden by law in some states."39 Many people believed
that slaves were less than human.40 Those who believed in the
equality of the races were few.
The revolutionaries had the chance to abolish slavery and
ground the new nation firmly on espoused egalitarian principles
while drafting the Constitution. They failed to do so. During
the convention in 1787, the delegates agreed on an infamous
30. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
31. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
32. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
33. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3; Le Grand v. Darnall, 27 U.S. 664
(1829); Johnson v. Tompkins, 13 F. Cas. 840 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 7,416).
34. See JON-CHRISTIAN SUGGS, WHISPERED CONSOLATIONS: LAw AND NARRA-
TIVE IN AFRICAN AMERICAN LIFE 21 (2000).
35. See id. at 25-26.
36. Id. at 25.
37. ROBERT B. SHAw, A LEGAL HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES 174
(1991).
38. Id. at 175-83.
39. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 490 (1954).
40. See, e.g., Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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solution to the dispute over slavery, the three-fifths compro-
mise.41 The compromise between slave states and "free" states
provided each slave would count as three-fifths of a person for
purposes of representation and taxation.42 Otherwise, slaves
counted for nothing. The drafters codified the idea that slaves
were property instead of people in Article IV, Section 2, Clause
3 of the Constitution. 43 The Thirteenth Amendment eventually
preempted this section. 44
Prior to the beginning of the Civil War, the federal govern-
ment passed the Fugitive Slave Act, which made certain that
slaves who escaped to "free" states would never really be free.45
This Act allowed their former masters to claim them whenever
they pleased and made resisting the return to captivity a
crime. 46 In 1857, the Supreme Court articulated the hatred and
prejudice of the day with its decision in the notorious Dred Scott
case.47 In his analysis of whether Scott was a citizen with
standing to sue his "owner" for assault, Chief Justice Taney
wrote that the prevailing societal view when the Constitution
was written was that the black race was "so far inferior, that
they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect
.. .. 48 Despite the rampant bigotry explained in Justice Ta-
ney's opinion, slavery was eventually abolished. It took a civil
war, massive casualties and an amendment to the Constitution
to accomplish it. 49
Despite the abolition of slavery with the passage of the
Thirteenth Amendment, the Southern states tried to preserve
slavery in the "Black Codes," legislation designed to keep newly
freed blacks in the same position they were before the Civil
War.50  "[An increasingly conservative Supreme Court"51
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
42. Id.
43. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII § 1.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
45. SUGGS, supra note 34, at 26.
46. Id.
47. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
48. Id. at 407.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
50. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRIN-
CIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 48 (1988).
51. W. Haywood Burns, Law and Race in Early America, in THE POLITICS OF
LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 283 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
2003]
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helped perpetuate the "badges & incidents of slavery"52 by tak-
ing a narrow view of the reconstruction amendments. In 1866,
in response to this crisis, Senator Trumbull, an abolitionist and
member of the House Judiciary Committee, proposed a bill to
protect civil rights.53 His bill became the Civil Rights Act of
1866. 54 Trumbull's Act was an attempt to re-establish the
American ideal of equality for all. In part, it read,
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any
foreign power... are hereby declared to be citizens of the United
States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard
to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude ...
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the
United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and con-
vey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains and penalties, and to none other .... 55
This Act evolved into 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982.56
The passage of the Civil Rights Act was insufficient to en-
sure nationalization of equality, and continuing doubts about
the security of civil rights led Congress to propose the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified
in 1868 and it provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its ju-
risdiction the equal protection of the laws. 57
Despite the concerted effort of the federal government to restore
some semblance of liberty to all Americans, segregation and
prejudice persisted.
In 1896, in Plessy v. Fergeson, the Supreme Court officially
approved segregation as consonant with the supreme law of the
52. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
53. THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION: CASE AND MATERIALS 12
(4th ed. 1996).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 13.
56. Id. at 789.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
308 [Vol. 24:301
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land.58 Despite the fact that such segregation violated every
principle the country had fought for when it declared its free-
dom in 1776, "separate but equal" endured for fifty-eight years.
The Supreme Court finally overruled Plessy and its "separate
but equal" compromise in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.59 In Brown I, the Court held that separate educational fa-
cilities were inherently unequal and violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection under the law.
60
The Court's decision, although an unprecedented break from
the recent past, was only the first of many steps that would be
necessary to undo the terrible damage that slavery had done to
the essential American dream of freedom.
Throughout the 1950's and 1960's, the black civil rights
movement struggled for freedom while the Supreme Court and
the federal government tried to dismantle the culture of slavery
entrenched in the United States. By 1870, the states had rati-
fied the Fifteenth Amendment, which read, "[tihe right of citi-
zens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of race, color or
previous condition of servitude,"61 but it took federal interven-
tion with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to make the revolution-
ary goal of sweeping participation in government a reality for
black men.62 It took the Supreme Court's holding in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,63 to start making
Brown's vision of integrated schooling a reality.64
It has been a long road to freedom and the journey towards
equality continues. Still, many of the evils of slavery and its
aftermath have been remedied. For example, marriage between
the races cannot be outlawed; 65 a willing seller and a willing
buyer may contract to exchange land regardless of their races;66
blacks cannot be subjected to harsher criminal laws than
58. Plessy v. Fergeson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
59. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
60. Id. at 495.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
62. Alan Freeman, Anti-discrimination from 1954 to 1989: Uncertainty, Con-
tradiction, Rationalization, Denial, in THE POLITICS OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRI.
TIQUE 294 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
63. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
64. Freeman, supra note 62, at 295.
65. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
66. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1948).
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whites;67 and a public inn may not exclude a paying guest solely
on the basis of color.68 Slowly, the American people have been
reclaiming their original dream of liberty and justice for all.
B. The Women's Civil Rights Movement
Women's co-extensive fight for the right to participate in
their government culminated in the Nineteenth Amendment,
which finally granted them the right to vote in 1920.69 Their
fight for equality in all other areas of life continues today.
In the early 1800s, women, like slaves, were considered
property.70 They could not own property, had no right to "an
independent name, earnings [they could] call [their] own, con-
trol of [their] children, independent legal existence, and locomo-
tion and bodily security . "..."71 Women could not serve on
Grand Juries;72 form partnerships on their own;73 hold office;74
participate in government; 75 or practice law. 76 Upon divorce,
67. Civil Rights Act of May 31, 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2003).
68. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
69. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
70. DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 138 (1998)
(citing Representative Farnsworth, CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. (1865)).
71. Id. at 114.
72. Harland v. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 131, 140 (1887) (holding that women
cannot serve on grand juries because "the labor and responsibility which it imposes
[is) so onerous and burdensome, and.., utterly unsuited to the physical constitu-
tion of females . . .).
73. Bradstreet v. Baer, 41 Md. 19 (1874).
Married women have no power, under our laws, to enter into contracts of co-
partnership, nor as members thereof would their contracts be binding upon
them, and, consequently, would not bind the other parties to them. Co-part-
nerships, consisting in whole or in part of married women, are inconsistent
with the policy of the legislation of this State, and it is manifest that their
existence would materially interfere with the marital rights of the husband.
Id. at 23-24.
74. Robinson's Case, 131 Mass. 376 (1881).
The word "citizen," when used in its most common and most comprehensive
sense, doubtless includes women; but a woman is not, by virtue of her citi-
zenship, vested by the Constitution of the United States, or by the Constitu-
tion of the Commonwealth, with any absolute right, independent of
legislation, to take part in the government, either as a voter or as an officer,
or to be admitted to practice as an attorney.
Id. at 376-77.
75. Id. at 377.
76. Id.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol24/iss1/17
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women "automatically lost custody of their children."77 Women
were so subordinate to men that a man who forced his wife to
have sex with him could not be guilty of rape. The common law
and States' statutes provided for a marital exemption to rape
charges. 78 Women who committed crimes were subject, like
blacks, to longer sentences. 79
Women's fight for equal rights began early in American his-
tory with the feminist abolitionist movement, designed to eradi-
cate slavery. Scholars and thinkers in the movement found, in
their own lives, echoes of the slavery they fought to abolish.80
Mary Wollstonecraft, writing in 1792, believed that women
were dehumanized in society. She asked, "[i]s one half of the
human species, like the poor African slaves, to be subject to
prejudices that brutalize them ... ?'8 In her Seneca Falls ad-
dress in 1854, Elizabeth Cady Stanton pointed out that women
lacked the rights of male citizens in that they could not vote or
hold office and were not entitled to a trial by their peers or
equal treatment under criminal law.8 2 Stanton made her argu-
ment for the equal treatment of women by saying that the
"rights of every human being are the same and identical."8 3 In
1851, at the Akron Women's Rights Convention, white minis-
ters disrupted the speakers by shouting out biblical strictures
against female equality.8 4 In response, Sojourner Truth, an ex-
slave, got up to counter them. In doing so, she brought the wo-
men's and black civil rights movements together saying,
77. LORRAINE DUSKY, STILL UNEQUAL 135 (1996)
78. A husband who forced his wife to have sex with him was not guilty of rape
under the common law or some rape statutes, which provided for a marital exemp-
tion. See, e.g., State v. Paolella, 554 A.2d 702, 708 (Conn. 1989); People v. Peraza,
733 N.Y.S.2d 510, 514 (App. Div. 2001) (explaining the common law and statutory
schemes of marital exemption); A husband was found not guilty of aggravated sod-
omy because divorce action was not final at the time he attacked his wife. Because
they were still married, the husband was entitled to the marital rape exemption.
State v. Dubish, 675 P.2d 877 (Kan. 1984).
79. J.R. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 318-19 (1978).
80. RICHARDS, supra note 70, at 63-124.
81. Id. at 70.
82. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Address to the Joint Judiciary Committee, New
York Legislature, 1854, in THE SEARCH FOR SELF-SOVEREIGNTY 97-109 (Beth M.
Waggenspack ed., 1989).
83. Id. at 107.
84. RICHAIDs, supra note 70, at 116.
3112003]
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I tink dat 'twixt de neggers of de Souf and de womin at de Norf, all
talk 'bout rights, de white men will be in a fix pretty soon... Look
at me! Look at my arm! . . . I have ploughed, and planted, and
gathered in barns, and no man could head me! And a'n't I a wo-
man? I could work as much and eat as much as a man - when I
could get it - and bear de lash as well! And a'n't I a woman? I have
born thirteen chilern and seen 'em mos' all sold off to slavery, and
when I cried out with my mother's grief, none but Jesus heard me.
And a'n't I a woman?85
The women's movement slowly gained political strength.
For example, in 1909, female garment workers in New York
City undertook a great strike under the authority of the New
York Women's Trade Union League.8 6 The politically powerful
Women's Christian Temperance Union was instrumental in its
support of the Eighteenth Amendment, which, after its ratifica-
tion in 1918, led immediately to Prohibition.8 7 Yet it was not
until 1920 that women finally gained the right to participate
fully in their own government.88
During the Second World War, women were asked to work
outside the home for the good of the country and they came out
in record numbers.8 9 In 1943, a women's baseball league was
organized and the players were eventually inducted into the
Baseball Hall of Fame.90 One woman, Frances Perkins, served
as Secretary of Labor in President Roosevelt's administration
during the New Deal.91 After the War, however, women's posi-
tions did not improve much despite their war effort and the
work they had done in formerly male dominated industries. In
the 1960's, women remained vastly underrepresented in the
professional world. A bare seven percent of doctors, three per-
cent of lawyers, and one percent of engineers were women.92 At
that time, married women were still restrained by legal disabil-
85. Id. (citation omitted).
86. POLE, supra note 79, at 307.
87. Id. at 309.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
89. Eleanor Roosevelt, American Women in the War, READER'S DIGEST, Jan.
1944, at 42-44, available at http://newdeal.feri.org/er/erl4.htm (Sept. 9, 2003).
90. TRUDY J. HAMMER, THE ALL-AMERIcAN GIRLS PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL
LEAGUE (1994).
91. POLE, supra note 79, at 310.
92. Id. at 311 (citing Martha Weinman Lear, The Second Feminist Wave, in
THE NEW FEMINISM OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 163-64 (June Sochen ed., 1971)).
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ity and were often unable to contract or transfer property inde-
pendent of their husbands.9 3
Women consistently petitioned the court system to over-
turn oppressive laws and the legislatures to create new ones.
They fought within the system, using the Constitution, to gain a
measure of equality. As time passed, the courts of the fifty
states overturned the marital rape exemption laws (as chal-
lenged in criminal cases) and made it a crime for a man to rape
any woman regardless of whether he was married to her.
Great strides were made in legislation with the passage of
Title VII, Title IX and the Equal Pay Act of 1963. The Equal
Pay Act, passed by President John F. Kennedy, was proposed to
ensure women and men received equal wages for equal work.94
At the time, women were paid between three and ten percent
less than men were for the same jobs.95 Though the Equal Pay
Act was a step forward, there were so many exceptions to it "as
to render it ineffective in many of the cases where women's con-
tributions were ... most distinctive. '96 Title VII, dealing with
equal employment, promised to put women on equal footing in
employment cases.9 7 Although there is still work to be done,
women have improved their lot in America and gained the right
to equal treatment before the law and to freedom from discrimi-
nation based on sex. 98
C. The Gay Civil Rights Movement
"With liberty and justice for all."99
America started with a dream of equality that is still in the
process of being realized. The movement for gay and lesbian
equality does not mirror any one previous civil rights move-
ment, but rather, runs parallel to them all and has, at its core,
93. Id. at 312.
94. Equal Pay Act § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1963); POLE, supra note 79, at 316.
95. POLE, supra note 79, at 316.
96. Id.
97. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1964).
98. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (discussing
how women can serve on juries and holding that the use of preemptory challenges
based solely on the sex of the juror violates equal protection); Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding that women in the military cannot be treated
differently for the purpose of determining dependent benefits).
99. PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE.
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the same goal, equal treatment before the law. Homosexuals'
fight for equality, like that of women and minorities, is a stren-
uous one, an ongoing uphill battle.
Currently, homosexuals can be discharged from the mili-
tary solely because they are gay. 100 They can be fired for their
sexual orientation. 10' They can be discriminated against in em-
ployment and housing. 0 2 Common laws of intestacy do not ap-
ply to same sex couples.'0 3 Partners in a same sex union are not
considered as each other's next of kin for the purpose of making
medical care decisions.'0 4 In some states, same sex partners
may not adopt each other's children while retaining original pa-
rental rights, as heterosexual stepparents can. 10 5 One partner
in a same sex relationship may be denied a legal relationship to
the children born into that relationship, as well as visitation
and custody.'0 6 Until this year, sex between homosexuals was
still a crime in thirteen states. 0 7
Currently, only one state, Massachusetts, recognizes the
right of two people of the same sex to marry.'08 A few state and
local governments provide for registration of domestic partner-
ships or for civil unions. 0 9 The federal government does not
recognize any same sex union, solemnized in any state, as a
100. E.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 630 (2d Cir. 1998).
101. See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 450 (6th Cir.
1984).
102. See, e.g., Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir.
1997).
103. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hall, 707 N.E.2d 201 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
104. See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999).
105. See, e.g., Adoption of T.K.J. v. State, 931 P.2d 488, (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
106. See, e.g., Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991); West
v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 160 (Ct. App. 1997); S v. S, 608 S.W.2d 64, 66
(Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (lesbianism of the custodial parent may, by itself, constitute
sufficient reason to revoke the mother's custody); Scott v. Scott, 665 So. 2d 760, 766
(La. Ct. App. 1995) ("It is the opinion of this court that under such facts, primary
custody with the homosexual parent would rarely be held to be in the best inter-
ests of the child.").
107. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481 (2003).
108. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003) (holding the
"Massachusetts Constitution affirms the dignity and equality of all individuals. It
forbids the creation of second-class citizens." The Commonwealth "has failed to
identify any constitutionally adequate reason for denying civil marriage to same-
sex couples").
109. Vermont provides for a civil union and California provides for registra-
tion of a domestic partnership. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202 (2003); CAL. FAM.
CODE § 297 (Deering 2003).
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marriage. DOMA was the first federal Act denying homosexual
couples the same rights as all other Americans and a new bar-
rier to the realization of the American dream. 11o
D. Show and Tell: Familiar Arguments Against Equal
Rights
"All animals are equal but some animals are more equal than
others.""'
Argument 1: Because God said so. "Natural law" and "natu-
ral order" dictate that marriage is between a man and a woman
only." 2 Reverend Lou Sheldon, founder of The Traditional
Family Values Coalition, calls the Federal Marriage Amend-
ment a "defining moment for American Christianity." Declar-
ing, "[wihat is at stake is no less than the doctrine of
creation." 1 3 Preventing gay marriage is "not discrimination.
It's common sense."1 4 The gay rights movement is a "well-
planned and well-financed attack on our civilization" that "sup-
porters of the Judeo-Christian ethic" must answer lest "militant
homosexuality ... defeat us."115
Compare Argument 1 with the following. "Nothing could be
more anti-Biblical than letting women vote."" 6 "The relative
positions to be assumed by man and woman in the working out
of our civilization were assigned long ago by a higher intelli-
gence than ours."117 The concurrence in Bower v. Hardwick and
Justice Scalia (dissenting) in Lawrence v. Texas both relied on
the Blackstone's Commentaries description of homosexual sod-
omy as a crime with deeper malignity than rape to support the
110. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
111. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 133 (Signet Classics 1945).
112. William J. Bennett, Editorial, What Natures Joins Let No Gays Put
Asunder; Marriage is Meant to be Between One Man and One Woman. Period., L.A.
TIMEs, Oct. 17, 2003, at 15.
113. Evelyn Nieves, Family Values Groups Gear Up For Battle Over Gay Mar-
riage, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2003, at A6.
114. Gary Bauer, Let's Pass a Marriage Amendment, NEWSDAY, Oct. 6, 2003,
at A27.
115. Nancy J. Knauer, Homosexuality as Contagion: From the Well of Loneli-
ness to the Boy Scouts, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 401, 494 (2000) (quoting Rep. William
Dannemyer, 1989).
116. MCWILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 336 (quoting Harper's Magazine edito-
rial, Nov. 1853).
117. Id. (quoting President Grover Cleveland discussing suffrage, 1905).
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holding that states could, without running afoul of the Constitu-
tion, fine or jail, or both, adult homosexuals for engaging in con-
sensual intimate acts in their own homes. William Blackstone,
who codified English law in Commentaries on the Laws of En-
gland, the "backbone of American common law," 118 also had
something to say about women. Blackstone wrote, "the very be-
ing or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the
marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that
of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she
performs everything... ."119 "[T]his doctrine [called coverture]
would later be compared to slavery."120 The Illinois Supreme
Court, in denying Myra Bradwell admission to the bar in 1870,
argued "t]hat God designed the sexes to occupy the different
spheres of action, and that it belonged to men to make, apply
and execute the laws, [is] regarded as an almost axiomatic
truth."' 21 "The paramount destiny and mission of women are to
fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is
the law of the Creator."122
Compare also with: "Almighty God created the races white,
black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate
continents." 23 "The fact that he separated the races shows that
he did not intend for the races to mix."1 24 The black race is "so
far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was
bound to respect .... ,,125 Defenders of slavery argued, "[n]o
human institution . . . [was] more manifestly consistent with
the will of God, than human slavery."1 26 They also stated, "slav-
ery had been 'intended by our creator for some useful purposes.'
"127 The duty of anti-abolitionists then was to "prevent blacks
from acquiring power in any form," which duty was "paramount
118. DusKy, supra note 77, 251.
119. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/
blackstone/bla-1 15.htm (Feb. 24, 2004).
120. DusKy, supra note 77, at 251.
121. In re Application of Bradwell, 55 Ill. 535, 539 (1876).
122. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872).
123. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (quoting the trial judge).
124. Id.
125. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856).
126. NELSON, supra note 50, 23 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
127. Id. (citation omitted).
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to all laws, all treaties, all constitutions" arising "from supreme
and permanent law of nature, the law of self-preservation. '"128
Argument 2: Homosexuals are inferior and same sex
couples are therefore unfit for marriage and child raising.
Same sex unions are "widely known to be promiscuous and un-
stable, no matter how much they say they are not."129
I write specially to state that the homosexual conduct of a par-
ent-conduct involving a sexual relationship between two persons
of the same gender-creates a strong presumption of unfitness
that alone is sufficient justification for denying that parent cus-
tody of his or her own children or prohibiting the adoption of the
children of others. 130
Compare Argument 2 with the following "[T]he real evil of
the negro race [was] that they are so fit for slavery as they
are."1 3 ' "No negro, or descendant of negroes, is a citizen of the
Union, or of any of the States. 32 They are mere "sojourners in
the land," inmates, allowed usually by tacit consent, sometimes
by legislative enactment, certain specific rights. 33 "Their sta-
tus and that of the citizen is not the same."1 34
Upon the whole, by whatever appellation we may designate free
negroes, whether as perpetual inhabitants, or citizens of an infer-
ior grade, we feel satisfied, that they are not citizens in the sense
of the Constitution; and, therefore, when coming among us, are
not entitled to all the "privileges and immunities" of citizens of
this State. 135
Compare also with:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natu-
ral and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female
sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The
128. NELSON, supra note 50, 23 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
129. BBC News, America's Marital Rows, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ameri-
cas/3195336.stm (Oct. 26, 2003) (quoting "Janice Shaw Crouse, a senior fellow at a
think-tank within Concerned Women For America").
130. Ex parte H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 26 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, C.J., concurring
specially).
131. NELSON, supra note 50, at 19 (quoting Negro Intellect-Ellis and
Douglass, and Uncle Tom, NAT'L ERA, June 2, 1853, at 2) (internal quotations
omitted).
132. State v. Claiborne, 19 Tenn. 331 (1838) (argument of attorney general).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 341.
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constitution of the family organization, which is founded on the
divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and
functions of womanhood.... The paramount destiny and mission
of women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother. This is the law of the Creator.136
Argument 3: There is a long standing tradition of discrimi-
nation against homosexuals. Sodomy was, before 1961, a crimi-
nal offense in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. 1
37
"[Hiomosexual conduct has historically been repudiated by
many religious faiths."'138 "Decisions of individuals relating to
homosexual conduct have been subject to state intervention
throughout the history of Western civilization. Condemnation
of those practices is firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and
ethical standards."1 39 "Homosexual conduct is, and has been,
considered abhorrent, immoral, detestable, a crime against na-
ture, and a violation of the laws of nature and of nature's God
upon which this Nation and our laws are predicated." 40 Homo-
sexuality has been subject to "constant quadrimillennial revul-
sion of moralistic civilizations from the vice that evoked the
total and everlasting destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah
... 141 Prohibiting same sex marriage is "not discrimination.
It's common sense."142
Compare Argument 3 with the following: "Free negroes
have always been a degraded race in the United States... with
whom public opinion has never permitted the population to as-
sociate with on terms of equality and in relation to whom, the
laws have never allowed . . . the immunities of the free white
136. DusKy, supra note 77, at 139-40 (citations omitted).
137. Lawrence v. Texas, 41 S.W.3d 349, 361 (Tx. App. 2001), rev'd, 123 S. Ct.
2472 (2003) (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193 (1986)).
138. Id. (justifying the anti-sodomy penal law).
139. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring specially). Amicus
briefs filed in Lawrence show scholarly disagreement with Burger's assertion of
continuing religious and societal comdemnation. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472.
140. Ex parte H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 26 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, C.J., concurring
specially).
141. Id. at 31. The crimes Sodom committed to deserve destruction appear to
be inhospitality (a heinous crime in the ancient world, particularly in desert com-
munities). See Genesis 19:1-5, 19:6-9.
142. Bauer, supra note 114, at 128.
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citizen." 143 "[Tihe immutable laws of God have fixed upon the
brows of the white races the ineffaceable stamp of superiority,
and all attempts to elevate the Negro to a social or political
equality with the white man are futile."144 "Nature's God in-
tended the African for the status of slavery."145
Truly then, as Reverend Pat Robertson himself once said,
"[t]he American public has a very short memory. "146
IV. Defense of Marriage Act
"The government of the United States is not, in any sense,
founded on the Christian religion."147
"[F] or why is my liberty judged of another man's conscience?" 148
The Defense of Marriage Act, sponsored by the thrice mar-
ried, twice divorced Robert Barr, a Republican Representative
from Georgia, was intended to "define and protect the institu-
tion of marriage" 49 by amending a section of the United States
Code dealing with "Powers Reserved to the States." The
amendment read
No State, territory or possession of the United States or Indian
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record or
judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or
tribe, respecting the relationship between persons of the same sex
that is treated as a marriage under the law of such other State,
territory, possession or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such
relationship. 150
It amended the United States Code at Chapter 1, Title 1 by ad-
ding a definition of "marriage" and "spouse" for the purposes of
"determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any rul-
ing, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative
bureaus and agencies of the United States."151 "Marriage" is
now defined as "only a legal union between one man and one
143. State v. Claiborne, 19 Tenn. 331, 339 (1838).
144. NELSON, supra note 50, at 98.
145. THEODORE LESKES, A CENTURY OF CMIL RIGHTS 17 (1961).
146. MCWILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 609.
147. Id. at 6 (quoting George Washington, 1796).
148. 1 Corinthians 10:29 (King James).
149. H.R. Con. Res. 3396, 104th Cong. (1996) (enacted).
150. Id.
151. Id.
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woman as husband and wife."152 "Spouse" is defined exclusively
as "a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."1 53
In 1996, an overwhelming majority of the House and Sen-
ate passed this Defense of Marriage Act, with 342 Representa-
tives voting in favor and only sixty-seven voting against it.15 In
the Senate, eighty-five senators voted in favor of the Act and
only fourteen voted against it.155 President Clinton, approved
this likely unconstitutional legislation by signing it into law,
without fanfare, and in the middle of the night. 56
During debates of this Act, the Representatives of our secu-
lar nation made it clear that the Act had a theocratic, Judeo-
Christian base. The purpose of the legislation was to preserve
"one of the essential foundations on which our civilization is
based" according to Representative Canady, a Republican from
Florida. 57 Canady stated that the family structure is based on
"our Judeo-Christian moral tradition." 58 In debate, he de-
clared, "[o]ur law should not treat homosexual relationships as
the moral equivalent of the heterosexual relationships on which
the family is based. That is why we are here today."15 9 With its
passage, DOMA codified the legal separation between heter-
osexuals and homosexuals and created a second class citizenry
by denying one discrete and insular group of Americans the fun-
damental rights belonging to all other Americans; the rights to
equal protection, to due process, to contract, and to marry.
V. DOMA and Full Faith and Credit
The Full Faith and Credit Clause reads, "Full Faith and
Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress
may by General Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof."160 DOMA created an exception to this clause.' 6'
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. H.R. Con. Res. 3396, 104th Cong. (1996) (enacted).
155. Id.
156. Baker, supra note 5.
157. 142 CONG. REC. H7441 (July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Canady).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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Before the Constitution was written, the Articles of Confed-
eration governed this country. The new Americans, having just
finished a war with Britain, and being recently freed from the
supervision of the Crown created a government with an ex-
tremely weak central authority, incapable of tyranny. Unfortu-
nately for the citizens, the weak central government was also
incapable of pulling the states together to make a unified na-
tion. Each state could have its own money, could tax goods com-
ing into and leaving the state and each state could ignore the
laws of the several states.162 This model was ultimately unsuc-
cessful. The drafters of the Constitution, in an attempt to avoid
some of the problems that occurred under the Articles of Con-
federation, drafted the Full Faith and Credit Clause, so that no
state could ignore the laws or judgments of another and particu-
larly so that a judgment debtor in one state could not flee to
another state and thereby avoid payment. 163
Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, as traditionally
interpreted, all states must honor the judgments of the courts of
other states. 64 All states must at least acknowledge the "public
acts" or laws of other states. 65 DOMA changes this model. 66
DOMA states that if Vermont considers a same sex couple mar-
ried and issues a marriage license, and that couple moves to
Georgia, Georgia does not have to treat that couple as legally
married. 67 Any benefits that would otherwise accrue to that
couple in Georgia as a result of being married would not accrue
if Georgia simply chose not to recognize the marriage. 168
The federal government is not immune from the effects of
Full Faith and Credit. 69 Federal courts must honor the judg-
161. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
162. MITCHELL, supra note 23, at 6.
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908).
165. See, e.g., Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S.
493, 501 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S 532,
546 (1935).
166. For discussion of this principle see Mark Strasser, Baker and Some Reci-
pes For Disaster: On DOMA, Covenant Marriages, and Full Faith and Credit Ju-
risprudence, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 307 (1998).
167. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
168. See id.
169. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chem. Cont. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 462 (1982).
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ments of state courts. 170 The federal government is bound to
respect state laws in areas where the states are competent to
legislate and it is not.171 DOMA states that the federal govern-
ment will not recognize such same sex unions as legal mar-
riages.172 Any benefits provided to married couples by the
federal government, such as transfer tax benefits, do not apply
to same sex couples even if they were married in and live in a
state that recognizes their union as a legal marriage. 73
The power of Congress is an awesome power. The Consti-
tution and federal law made "in Pursuance thereof' constitutes
the "supreme Law of the Land," which supercedes "any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary .... ,,174
The Constitution provides for Full Faith and Credit. 75 DOMA
provides an exception to this Constitutional mandate. 76 The
ability of Congress to create such exception is not explicitly pro-
vided for in the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 177 Furthermore,
the Act runs counter to the character of the Constitution and
the personal freedoms enshrined within it.
Article V of the Constitution provides that two-thirds of
both houses may propose amendments to the Constitution,
which amendments are not valid or considered part of the Con-
stitution until ratified by three-fourths of the states. 178 DOMA
was not proposed as an amendment to the Constitution. It was
not ratified by three-fourths of the states. Yet, it precipitated
an equally significant change in the Constitutional requirement
that states take notice of each other's laws, judgments and judi-
cial proceedings. 179
VI. Challenge: Vermont Decides
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Vermont held that under the
Common Benefits clause of its state constitution, same sex
170. Id.
171. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. X.
172. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
173. See id.
174. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
175. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
176. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
177. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
178. U.S. CONST. art. V.
179. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
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couples could not be "deprived of the statutory benefits and pro-
tections afforded persons of the opposite sex who choose to
marry."'80 The court held that it was up to the Legislature of
Vermont to construct a system that would give homosexual
couples those benefits and protections.' 8 ' Vermont's legislature
came up with the "civil union" in response to the court's direc-
tive.'8 2 Feeling ultimately uncomfortable with extending the
term "marriage" to a same sex union, the Vermont Legislature
enacted the civil union law, a separate but equal compromise.
8 3
After the decision in Baker v. State,84 and the enactment of
a civil unions law without a residency requirement, several
courts had reason to address the question of the extraterritorial
effect of a Vermont civil union in light of DOMA and Full Faith
and Credit. For example, in Rosengarten v. Downes,8 5 a same
sex couple married in Vermont asked the court to grant them
the equivalent of a divorce. The Connecticut Court of Appeals
refused to do so, holding that it lacked the jurisdiction to dis-
solve a civil union made in Vermont.8 6 The court also took this
opportunity to discuss, in lengthy dicta, why same sex unions
violate the mores of the state of Connecticut.
8 7
VII. Same Sex Unions In Other States
In a case determining the claims of seven same sex couples
who applied for marriage licenses and were denied, the Supe-
rior Court of Massachusetts held that since "procreation is mar-
riage's central purpose, it is rational for the Legislature to limit
marriage to opposite-sex couples who, theoretically, are capable
of procreation." 8 8 One assumes the court means with each
other as, presumably, the majority of individuals involved in
same sex relationships are also capable of procreation. The City
180. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).
181. Id.
182. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5160 (2003).
183. Id.
184. 744 A.2d 864.
185. 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
186. Id. at 184.
187. Id. at 177-78.
188. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, No. 2001-1647-A, 2002 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 153, *48, 2002 WL 1299135, *13, vacated and remanded by, Goodridge v.
Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003).
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of Philadelphia enacted local legislation creating the "status of
'life partnership' between members of the same sex"189 and for-
bade "discrimination in employment and places of public accom-
modations based on 'marital status.' "190 It also excluded a
transfer tax on the "transfer of real estate between [l]ife
[p]artners" granting those couples the same property rights as
heterosexual couples. 191 In Devlin v. City of Philadelphia, the
Pennsylvania court overruled this legislation as "ultra vires."192
In Littleton v. Prange, the Texas appellate court held that a wo-
man who had male to female sex reassignment surgery before
getting married could not sue for the wrongful death of her
spouse because she was technically a man and therefore could
never have been legally married and therefore did not have
standing to bring a wrongful death action as surviving
spouse.193
The courts are being used in an all too familiar fashion to
strip United States citizens of their natural rights. Opponents
of same sex marriage fear that same sex couples will be able to
influence enough state legislatures to make same sex marriage
a reality in this country. 94 The Alliance for Marriage would
like to stop this from happening and maintain the oppressed
position of homosexuals in American society. To this end, they
proposed an amendment to the Constitution that would institu-
tionalize this oppression.
VIII. Federal Marriage Amendment
"It would be against the spirit of our free institutions, by which
equal rights are intended to be secured to all, to grant peculiar
franchises and privileges to a body of individuals merely for the
purpose of enabling them more conveniently and effectually to
advance their own private interests."195
189. Devlin v. City of Philadelphia, 809 A.2d 980, 981 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
190. Id. at 982.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 993.
193. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
194. Federal Marriage Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 93, 107th Cong. (2002), avail-
able at http://www.allianceformarriage.org/reports/fma/amendment.htm (July 12,
2001) (on file with author).
195. NELSON, supra note 50, at 16 (citation omitted).
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On July 12, 2001, the Alliance for Marriage held a press
conference to explain their proposed amendment to the Consti-
tution: the Federal Marriage Amendment. The proposed
amendment reads:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a
man and a woman. Neither this constitution nor the constitution
of any state, nor state or federal law, shall be construed to require
that marital status or the legal incidents there of be conferred
upon unmarried couples or groups. 196
The avowed purpose of the Alliance for Marriage is to promote
marriage, address "the crisis of fatherless families in the United
States,... restore a culture of married fatherhood in American
society," 197 and solve the problem of the "tragedy of family disin-
tegration in America" by proffering an amendment that would
prevent an entire segment of Americans from marrying and
raising children.198 The group believes that same sex marriage
would "erase the legal roadmap to marriage and the family,"199
presumably making it even more difficult for married people to
stay married and for absent fathers to embrace their responsi-
bilities.200 No further rationale is offered.
Representative Ronnie Shows, a Democrat from Missis-
sippi, introduced the amendment to the House of Representa-
tives on May 15, 2002.201 It was referred to the House
Committee on the Judiciary the same day.20 2 The bill was de-
scribed as a "joint resolution" and it was co-sponsored by
twenty-one Republicans and three Democrats. 20 3 The sponsors
included representatives from Utah, Virginia, Texas, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Louisiana,
Missouri, Florida, Colorado, Kentucky, and Maryland.20 4 As of
the date of this article, this amendment has not been submitted
196. Federal Marriage Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 93, 107th Cong. (2002), avail-
able at http://www.allianceformarriage.org/reports/fma/amendment.htm (July 12,
2001) (on file with author).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. H.R.J. Res. 93, 107th Cong. (2002).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
20031 325
25
PACE LAW REVIEW
to the House and Senate for a vote but it has been already im-
plicitly approved by President George W. Bush.205
If this amendment passes two-thirds of the House and Sen-
ate, at least three-fourths of the legislatures of the fifty states
will have to ratify it before it becomes a part of the Constitu-
tion.20 6 In the entire history of the United States, there have
been just twenty-seven amendments made to the Constitu-
tion.20 7 The first ten Amendments, known as the Bill of Rights,
were ratified in 1791.208 Only one Amendment, the Eighteenth,
instituting Prohibition, has been repealed. 20 9 If the Federal
Marriage Amendment becomes part of the Constitution, it will
be the first to violate the text and spirit of the Constitution and
the first to seriously contract the fundamental rights of Ameri-
can citizens.
A. Two Steps Forward, Two Steps Back
The Constitution begins:
We the people of the United States, in order to form a more per-
fect Union, establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide
for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain
and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America. 210
The purpose of the Constitution, set out in the preamble, is
to draw the states together and provide all "the people of the
United States" with all the benefits of the Union and the "Bless-
ings of Liberty."211 There is no mention in the preamble that
the benefits being secured thereby would only apply to certain
favored groups and not to others. Yet, the United States has
repeatedly deprived one or more groups of its citizen of the
rights enjoyed by the rest.212 The Federal Marriage Amend-
205. Martha Brant, Bush and the Gay Debate, at http://stacks.msnbc.com/
news/949175.asp (Aug. 6, 2003).
206. U.S. CONST. art. V.
207. MITCHELL, supra note 23, at 30.
208. Id. at 27.
209. Id. at 32.
210. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., RicHARDs, supra note 70, at 114 (discussing rights that were
available to men but not to women).
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ment, in the guise of providing a "legal roadmap to marriage
and family,"213 would remove from homosexual citizens the fun-
damental rights enjoyed by all other Americans under the
Constitution.
Fundamental rights are those "basic right[s],"214 firmly es-
tablished and "repeatedly recognized," 21 5 "implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty,"216 and "preservative of all rights."21 7
They include the rights explicit in the Constitution and more.
They include access to courts regardless of financial means,218
voting,219 interstate travel, 220 privacy, 221 and marriage. 222 So
precious are these liberties, that when a law implicates a funda-
mental right, the courts must apply heightened judicial scru-
tiny when determining its legitimacy.223 The revolutionaries
had as their goal the security of such basic and fundamental
rights. To this end, they enshrined these basic rights in the
Constitution. Proponents of same sex unions have argued that
their right to marry lies within the reach of the First Amend-
ment, Eighth Amendment, 224 Fourteenth Amendment (Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses), and the Ninth Amend-
ment,225 but so far, most courts have not agreed. 226
213. Federal Marriage Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 93, 107th Cong. (2002), avail-
able at http://www.allianceformarriage.org/reports/fma/amendment.htm (July 12,
2001) (on file with author).
214. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631(1969).
215. Id. at 642.
216. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
217. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
218. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwrght, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Douglas v. Califor-
nia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
219. Reynold v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
220. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 643 (1969).
221. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965) (discussing contra-
ception as being protected under the right to privacy); Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (dis-
cussing abortion as being protected under the right to privacy).
222. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
223. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17
(1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520 (1970).
224. See Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47, 48-49 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
225. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
226. See id.; Burns, 560 S.E.2d at 48-49.
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B. Badges and Incidents
Marriage is both a contract matter and a domestic relations
matter. Most states, and the federal government, do not allow
homosexuals to form marriage contracts. The inability to con-
tract was considered a characteristic of slavery and, after the
Civil War, remained a "badge and incident of slavery."227 The
Thirteenth Amendment destroyed slavery, and the Civil Rights
Acts were designed to destroy its badges and incidents. 228 The
current federal and state laws and the proposed Federal Mar-
riage Amendment put homosexuals, in some sense, in the same
position as freed slaves after the civil war: free in name only
and shackled in the eyes of the state. It puts them in the same
position as women under the slavery-like "coverture;" legally in-
competent. In this way, the Federal Marriage Amendment also
violates the spirit of the Thirteenth Amendment's proscription
of slavery and the Civil Rights Act's attempt to abolish the
badges and incidents thereof. Enshrining discrimination in the
Constitution sets America back in its historical search for lib-
erty and justice for all and tells its lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgendered citizens that they are a second class within their
own country and that their government approves of their subju-
gation and moral slavery. 229
IX. A Mandate from the People
"[ou must first enable the government to control the gov-
erned; and in the next place oblige it to control itself."23 0
The federal government is without the authority to define
marriage for the states.231 The states and not the federal gov-
ernment have traditionally had the power to regulate marriage
and other domestic relations matters, subject to the strictures of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 232 Nowhere in the Constitution is
the federal government given the power to restrict marriage to
a select group of people. The Tenth Amendment provides that
"power[] not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
227. See generally EISENBERG, supra note 53, at 3-63.
228. See generally id.
229. See generally RICHARDS, supra note 70.
230. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
231. See, e.g., Dodson v. State, 31 S.W. 977 (Ark. 1895).
232. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
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tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or. to the people."233
The proposed Federal Marriage Amendment purports to
define marriage for the states and forbid the state courts from
construing their own laws and constitutions as permitting or re-
quiring recognition of same sex marriages. The amendment
reads, "Em]arriage in the United States shall consist only of the
union of a man and a woman."234 It also provides that no state
constitution or law "shall be construed to require that marital
status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmar-
ried couples or groups."235 In passing this amendment, the fed-
eral government could not only define marriage for every state,
but could also tell each state what its laws and Constitution
mean. This it may not do. The Supreme Court may tell a state
that its laws or constitution violate the United States Constitu-
tion by interfering with basic rights;236 the legislature may pre-
empt state law where it is competent to legislate,237 but it cannot
tell the states what their laws do and do not require. For exam-
ple, if a federal court decides a question of federal law that also
contains a state law component, the state in which the court sits
is not bound by the federal court's interpretation of state law. 238
If the states ratify the amendment, they allow the federal gov-
ernment to invade their sovereignty.239
For Congress to propose such an amendment is akin to
stating that the federal government can, by amendment, take
any power for itself that it wishes even if that power were re-
served to the states or the people or forbidden to Congress. This
233. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
234. Federal Marriage Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 93, 107th Cong. (2002), avail-
able at http://www.allianceformarriage.org/reports/fma/amendment.htm (July 12,
2001) (on file with author).
235. Id.
236. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1958).
237. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n., 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983).
238. See, e.g., Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590, 626 (1875); U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 524 U.S. 779, 812 (1995); Mason v. American Emery
Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1957).
239. This truth has created a rather awkward situation as those who tradi-
tionally oppose gay marriage are also those who traditionally support states'
rights. See HuMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, at http://www.hrc.org/marriage (Oct. 31,
2003).
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is not what the founders of this country intended. In fact, they
specifically guarded against it in the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments.240 When the Constitution was drafted, its purpose was
to create a union out of thirteen feuding sovereigns and secure
the natural rights of all citizens from invasion by either the
states or the federal government. 241 The founders also intended
to protect the populace from tyranny in the new government by
creating a system of checks and balances.242 The Federal Mar-
riage Amendment blurs the line between the separate branches
of government, which are currently duty bound to respect each
other's provinces. 243
The amendment would also restrict the Judiciary's ability
to interpret the constitution and federal law. The Federal Mar-
riage Amendment reads, in part, "[n]either this constitution...
nor ... federal law, shall be construed to require that marital
status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmar-
ried couples or groups."244 The government of the United States
is comprised of three co-equal branches, the legislature, execu-
tive, and judiciary and their powers "are defined and limited."245
In order that the limits of the legislature were not "mistaken, or
forgotten, the constitution [was] written."246 The Supreme
Court is in charge of interpreting the Constitution and it is "em-
phatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is."247 The principle of judicial review laid out
by Marbury v. Madison,248 "has ever since been respected by
[the] Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable
feature of our constitutional system."249 The judiciary has the
ability and the duty to look into the whole of the Constitution
when determining a question of law.250 This function of the ju-
240. U.S. CONST. amend. IX; U.S. CONST. amend. X.
241. See U.S. CONST. pmbl.
242. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 234-35 (1993).
243. Id.
244. Federal Marriage Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 93, 107th Cong. (2002), avail-
able at http://www.allianceformarriage.org/reports/fma/amendment.htm (July 12,
2001) (on file with author).
245. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 177.
248. Id. at 178.
249. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
250. Id.
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diciary was explained by Alexander Hamilton when he wrote,
"[t] he interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar prov-
ince of the courts"251 and it belongs to the judges to ascertain
the meaning of the Constitution and "any particular act pro-
ceeding from the legislature."252 For the federal government to
pass and the states to ratify an amendment removing the power
of the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution would be to
invade the sovereign province of the judiciary. To remove the
power of the federal courts to interpret federal law would also
invade the province of the judiciary. This is what the Federal
Marriage Amendment will do. It will upset the carefully bal-
anced spheres of government and it will be unsupported by wis-
dom, reason, or precedent.
This is not to say that such an amendment could not be
passed, but that it should not. Never in our history has there
been an amendment to the Constitution that has abridged natu-
ral rights in the way that the Federal Marriage Amendment
would. Yet Congress and the President, without advancing a
legitimate explanation are willing to do this:253 ignore 200 plus
years of history and the purpose of the Constitution and upset
the careful balance of government and the principles of federal-
ism and state's rights, simply to ensure that one small segment
of society may not marry.
X. Equal Protection
"The equal protection clause ceases to assure either equality or
protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can
be pointed out between those bound and those left free."254
"The universal application of law to all citizens has been a tenet
of English common law since at least the Magna Carta, and our
251. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
252. Id.
253. President Bush says he approves of the Federal Marriage Amendment
and that, although "we are all sinners," he would not allow gay marriage to be
legitimized. Martha Brant, Bush and the Gay Debate, at http://stacks.msnbc.com/
news/949175.asp (Aug. 6, 2003).
254. Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 115 (1949) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
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whole system of law is predicated on this fundamental
principle., 255
A. Suspect Classes
The Equal Protection Clause was designed to "hold over
every American citizen . . . the protecting shield of law,"256 to
ensure the right of individuals to be free from legislation that
singled them out because of their membership in a particular
class of people such as former slaves, women, blacks, Jews,
Irish, etc.257 It embodied the ideal that laws be applied equally
to all.258 In Railway Express, the Court held, "[tihe framers of
the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that
there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary
and unreasonable government than to require that the princi-
ples of law which officials would impose upon a minority must
be imposed generally."259 It continued, "nothing opens the door
to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to
pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation
"260
Legislation that targets a suspect class is reviewed under
strict scrutiny. In order to survive this inquiry, the legislation
that applies only to a suspect class must further a compelling
state interest and be necessary and narrowly tailored to meet
that compelling interest.261 Race and ethnicity are "inherently
suspect" classes because of our unfortunate American history.
262
Gender or sex is also considered "suspect"263 but legislation that
is imposed on only one gender or sex is generally reviewed by
255. Lawrence v. Texas, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tx. App. 2001), rev'd, 123 S. Ct. 2472
(2003) (citing Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921)) (internal quotations
omitted).
256. HOWARD N. MEYER, THE AMENDMENT THAT REFUSED To DIE 78 (1973).
257. See, e.g., Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraj, 481 U.S. 604 (1987) (dis-
cussing the Civil Rights Act, which arose out of the same concerns addressed by
the Fourteenth Amendment).
258. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 336 U.S. at 112 (Jackson, J., concurring)
("Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require
that laws be equal in operation.").
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
262. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978).
263. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
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the court under the lower standard of intermediate scrutiny.264
To survive a review under intermediate scrutiny, the chal-
lenged legislation "must serve important governmental objec-
tives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives." 265 The means must "fit" the ends. 266
When deciding whether to add a classification to the list of
suspect classes, the Court will consider whether the group is a
"discrete and insular minority' requiring extraordinary protec-
tion from the majoritarian political processes;" 267 whether the
characteristic being used "frequently bears no relation to [the]
ability to perform or contribute to society;"268 whether the clas-
sification is based on "an immutable characteristic determined
solely by the accident of birth,"269 or whether the class was sub-
jected to "a history of purposeful unequal treatment .... "270
Sexual orientation should be considered either a suspect or
quasi-suspect class because homosexuals, as a group, have his-
torically been the subject of discrimination and hatred271 and
because they are a discreet and insular minority.27 2 Sexual ori-
entation is also unrelated to the ability to perform or contribute
to society and it is particularly unrelated to the statutory re-
quirements of marriage. 273
As of the date of this article, sexual orientation is not con-
sidered a suspect or quasi-suspect class and legislation that
targets homosexuals, as a class, must only survive the so-called
rational basis test or conventional equal protection analysis.274
Under conventional or traditional equal protection analysis,
when legislation does not target a suspect class, or does not im-
plicate a fundamental constitutional right, that legislation need
264. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 247.
265. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
266. Id. at 211.
267. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290.
268. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
269. Id.
270. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
271. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring) (historical legal commentators condemned homosexual sodomy as "an offense
of 'deeper malignity' than rape. . . "); MCWILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 603-19.
272. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
273. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (Deering 2003).
274. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-36 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.
Ct. 2472 (2003).
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only be "rationally related to a legitimate [government]
interest."275
For example, New York City enacted a law that prohibited
vehicles used "merely or mainly" for advertising purposes, to be
operated on city streets. 276 Those who wished to advertise their
own businesses on their vehicles could continue to operate those
vehicles on the city streets.277 New York argued that trucks
with big advertisements on the sides that were unrelated to
products sold by the trucks' owners were distracting to drivers
and were therefore properly banned.278 The Supreme Court up-
held this legislation despite an equal protection challenge by a
nation wide express mail business that carried the advertising
of others on its trucks for a fee. 279 The Court held that the regu-
lation, although discriminatory, did not pose a problem because
the classification was legitimate, related "to the purpose for
which it [was] made," and did not touch a suspect class or fun-
damental right.280
Even under rational basis, if the challenged legislation does
not further a legitimate interest or the means of achieving that
interest are not rationally related to the ends, it will be over-
turned. In Romer v. Evans, the Court held that an amendment
to the Constitution of the state of Colorado removing all legal
protections from homosexuals as a group failed to meet even the
rational basis test because the state interest served by the legis-
lation was illegitimate and the means were not rationally re-
lated to the illegitimate ends. 281 The amendment provided:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or de-
partments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, munici-
palities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any
statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, les-
bian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person
275. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
276. New York City, N.Y. TRAF. REG. § 124, repealed by ch. 48, § 1 (Mar. 14,
1972).
277. Id.
278. Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109 (1949).
279. Id. at 110.
280. Id.
281. 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
334 [Vol. 24:301
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol24/iss1/17
SWEET LAND OF LIBERTY
or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. 282
In effect, the amendment repealed all current legal protec-
tions for homosexuals against discrimination of any kind.28 3 It
"nullifie[d] specific legal protections for this targeted class in all
transactions in housing, sale of real estate, insurance, health
and welfare services, private education, and employment."28 4
First, said the Court, the legislation challenged in Romer im-
posed "a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single
named group" and was "an exceptional ... invalid form of legis-
lation."285 Second, the Court held the "sheer breadth [of the leg-
islation] is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that
the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus to-
ward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legiti-
mate state interests."2 6 To sum up then, the Court held that a
lack of rational basis as evidenced by a malicious purpose be-
hind the legislation, such as discrimination for discrimination's
sake, would make a law unconstitutional even where the class
targeted by that law is considered neither suspect nor quasi-
suspect.287
Even if sexual orientation is neither suspect nor quasi-sus-
pect, as the Court held in Romer, laws denying them the right
to marry still violate the Equal Protection Clause because the
means are not rationally related to any legitimate end and the
proposed amendment is "inexplicable by anything but animus
toward the class it effects."28 8 The avowed ends are mainte-
nance of Judeo-Christian morals,28 9 family values, 290 and en-
couragement of procreation. 291 Yet, religious morality is not
282. Id. at 624.
283. Id. at 629.
284. Id. at 629.
285. Id. at 632.
286. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
287. See generally Romer, 517 U.S. 620.
288. Id. at 632.
289. See 142 CONG. REC. H7270 (daily ed. July 11, 1996).
290. See, e.g., HR. REP. No. 104-664 (1996) (recommending passage of DOMA).
291. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, No. 2001-1647-A, 2002 Mass.
Super. LEXIS 153, at *12, *46-47, 2002 WL 1299135, *4-5, *13 (holding that a
prohibition against same sex marriage did not violate a fundamental liberty nor
deprive any person of substantive due process, liberty, or freedom of speech or as-
sociation, that the law was rationally related to legitimate ends. The Court also
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now, and never has been, a legitimate state end. 292 Rather, the
"legitimacy of secular legislation depends . . . on whether the
State can advance some justification for its law beyond its con-
formity to religious doctrine." 293 Encouragement of procreation
may be a state interest but it is not rationally related to the
prohibition of same sex marriage because heterosexuals need
not procreate, desire to procreate, or indeed be able to procreate
to get married. 294 In fact, there is a constitutional right to pre-
vent procreation. 295 The reason the state has an interest in
"family values" in the first place is "not because they contribute,
in some direct and material way, to the general public welfare,
but because they form so central a part of an individual's
life."296 The state has an interest in protecting marriage be-
cause it "is an association that promotes a way of life, not
causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loy-
alty, not commercial or social projects."297 The state protects
procreation not out of some "demographic" or Biblical considera-
tion but "because parenthood alters so dramatically an individ-
ual's self-definition."298 Therefore, the central theme of all these
state interests is not the benefit that accrues to the state but
the benefits and rights of the individual members of the state.
Only granting marriage rights to everyone furthers this state
interest; withholding them from an insular minority does not.
The Federal Marriage Amendment would impose on homo-
sexuals alone a "special disability."299 State and federal stat-
utes, including DOMA, that deny the right to marry based on
indicated that it was not troubled that Massachusetts allowed same sex couples to
establish legal relationships with their children but not with each other), vacated
and remanded by, Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003).
292. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211 (1986)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
293. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429-53 (1961); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Ep-
person v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (explaining that where the sole purpose of
the legislation is to "endorse a particular religious doctrine" it furthers religion in
violation of the Establishment Clause).
294. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (Deering 2003).
295. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972).
296. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
297. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
298. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
299. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
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sex and sexual orientation already impose this "special disabil-
ity" on people that otherwise meet all established criteria to ob-
tain a marriage license. The Federal Marriage Amendment will
go even further. The Federal Marriage Amendment, like ex-
isting state and federal laws prohibiting same sex marriages, is
a "status based enactment divorced from any factual context" in
which courts "could discern a relationship to legitimate state in-
terests."300 All laws prohibiting same sex marriage are based on
"classification[s] of persons undertaken for [their] own sake,
something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit."301 As
all such legislation is "class legislation," it is "obnoxious to the
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment."30 2
B. Fundamental Rights
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."30 3 The law defines discrimination as different
treatment of similarly situated individuals. 30 4 Equal protection
means, "all persons.., shall stand equal before the laws of the
States."305 The Fourteenth Amendment incorporates most of
the first ten amendments and applies them to the states, mean-
ing that if the federal government cannot abridge those rights,
neither can the states. 30 6 The Supreme Court has held that
marriage is a fundamental right of the kind protected by the
Constitution from interference by the state and federal govern-
ment.30 7 All states recognize the civil contract between a man
and a woman arising out of a personal relationship, solemnized
as the states see fit, as a marriage. 308 States that prohibit same
sex marriages 30 9 prohibit same sex couples from making such
300. Id. at 635.
301. Id. (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883)).
302. Id. at 635.
303. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
304. See, e.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g, 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975)
(en banc).
305. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1879).
306. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
307. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
308. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 25.05.011 (Michie 2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-
11-101 (Michie 2003); CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (Deering 2003).
309. Among those states that prohibit same sex marriage are Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, and Hawaii.
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civil contracts. In effect, same sex couples are incompetent to
make such contracts in the same way that underage persons
and the mentally ill are incompetent to make marriage con-
tracts. 310 Most states consider same sex marriages to be void
and prohibited. Arizona, for example, considers such marriages
void in the same way that marriages between parents and chil-
dren, grandparents and grandchildren, brothers and sisters of
half and whole blood, uncles and nieces, aunts and nephews,
and between first cousins are void.311
The state of being married carries with it certain obliga-
tions and rights under state law. Spouses qualify as next of kin
and immediate family. This is important for rules of intestacy,
succession, probate, wrongful death actions, and health care.3 12
Intensive Care Units often limit the people who can visit a
critically ill person to immediate family. If one member of a
heterosexual marriage is ill, the other spouse can always visit
that person in the hospital, because he or she is considered im-
mediate family. A same sex partner of a critically ill person
may be barred from visiting her partner in an Intensive Care
Unit because they are not married. 313 If one member of an op-
posite sex marriage falls ill and becomes unable to direct her
own medical care, the spouse may direct such medical care
where there is no living will or health care directive to the con-
trary. The partners in a same sex couple cannot make such de-
cisions for each other in the absence of a living will or health
care directive.31 4
Married couples also enjoy certain tax benefits and spousal
immunity that same sex partners do not. For example when a
married couple gets divorced they may split an IRA into two
accounts when distributing marital property, essentially cash-
ing out the IRA. There are no tax penalties for this early pay-
out. When a same sex couple splits up, however, the same IRA
310. See ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (2003); ALASKA STAT. §§ 25-.05-.011, 013 (Michie
2003); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-101 (2003); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-101, 109, 208
(Michie 2003); CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (Deering 2003).
311. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-101 (2003).
312. See, e.g., Leszinske v. Poole, 798 P.2d 1049 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990); Lit-
tleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 230-31 (Tex. App. 1999).
313. See LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW, supra note 29, at xv-xx.
314. Robin Toppings, Gay Couples are Missing Out on Many Legal Milestones,
NEWSDAY, Mar. 16, 2004, at A64.
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split in the division of joint property carries an enormous tax
penalty that may cost the couple hundreds of dollars of their
own money.315 Same sex couples, because they cannot marry,
cannot freely confide in each other without the fear that each
can be forced to testify adversely against the other in open
court.316 Because they cannot marry in any state or form a legal
union in the majority of the states, and because the federal gov-
ernment recognizes no same sex marriages wherever solem-
nized, same sex couples that would otherwise qualify for the
numerous state and federal benefits of marriage are left with-
out the protection of the laws.
Most states include the following qualifications as pre-req-
uisites to marriage: age of majority, mental competence, no con-
sanguinity, not currently married.317 Same sex couples that
have all of the qualifications to be married cannot be married in
any state. Two states, California and Vermont, provide a sepa-
rate but equal compromise. 318 Vermont provides for a civil
union and California provides for registration of a domestic
partnership.31 9
Marriage is a fundamental right.3 20 Prohibiting homosexu-
als from enjoying this right does not serve a compelling state
interest. A statute that infringes on a fundamental right must
be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.
Statutes infringing on fundamental rights are subject to strict
315. Videotape: James T. Sexton, Knowing Your Rights: Making and Break-
ing Domestic Partnerships in the Tri-State Area, Address Before the Pace Univer-
sity School of Law LAMBDA Chapter (Oct. 28, 2003) (on file with Pace Law School
Library).
316. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (discussing the
evolution and current shape of spousal immunity).
317. See, e.g., CAL. Fm. CODE. § 297 (Deering 2003).
318. Westchester County, New York, also provides for registration of domestic
partnerships. See Domestic Partner Registry, at http://www.westchestergov.com/
lgbtc/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2004).
319. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202 (2003); CAL. FAM. CODE. § 297 (Deering
2003). California's domestic partnership registration also applies to opposite sex
couples over sixty-five years of age that are not married but otherwise maintain a
household. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003) (holding the
"Massachusetts Constitution affirms the dignity and equality of all individuals. It
forbids the creation of second-class citizens. The Commonwealth "has failed to
identify any constitutionally adequate reason for denying civil marriage to same-
sex couples").
320. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
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judicial scrutiny. Although it did not directly implicate mar-
riage, Bowers does discuss fundamental rights and homosexu-
als. The Court held that there is no fundamental right to
engage in homosexual sodomy. 321 In framing the issue thus, the
Court mischaracterized the rights the Georgia statute was actu-
ally infringing. 322 The rights implicated by the Georgia statute
were the fundamental rights to privacy and personal autonomy.
Though the Georgia statute prohibited any person, man or wo-
men, from engaging in sodomy with any other person, regard-
less of sex, the Court discussed the law solely in terms of
homosexuality, betraying an overwhelming personal bias unu-
sual in a neutral arbiter.323 The deliberate mischaracterization
of the issue presented allowed the divided Bowers Court to re-
move the right to privacy and physical intimacy from one spe-
cific group, homosexuals. The Court specifically expressed no
opinion on heterosexual sodomy and after Bowers, the rights of
heterosexuals to intimate relations remained protected. 324
Therefore, the only interest served by the Georgia statute and
approved by the Supreme Court was the desire to oppress one
group based solely on the gender and orientation of the couples
involved on the ground that homosexuality offended the Judeo-
Christian morals of the state legislators. 325 This interest is not
only not compelling, it is not even legitimate in a staunchly sec-
ular government. 326
Civil marriage is not like a Ferrari or a diamond; it does not
follow the laws of economics, gaining value as a result of rarity.
Allowing everyone who is otherwise qualified and wants to get
married to do so will not devalue the marriages currently ex-
isting.327 It has been acknowledged that divorce rates in Ameri-
can are quite high. If the country really wanted to preserve and
321. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-96 (1986).
322. See id. at 188.
323. Id.
324. Id.; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
325. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 211 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
326. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I; Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41
(1980); McGowan v. Maryland, 336 U.S. 420, 429-53 (1961); McWLLIAMs, supra
note 19, at 6 (quoting George Washington, 1796).
327. This does not speak to religious marriages as no one has, or likely ever
will, advance the illegitimate notion that religious institutions could or should be
forced by the state to acknowledge any marriage they did not perform.
340 [Vol. 24:301
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol24/iss1/17
SWEET LAND OF LIBERTY
encourage "traditional" marriages, as Alliance for Marriage pro-
poses, would legislatures not make it harder to both marry and
divorce? Yet, it is quite easy to get married and easy to get di-
vorced. In most states, couples wishing to get married must
meet only three simple criteria; they must be of the opposite
sex, of the age of majority, and unrelated to one another within
a certain degree of consanguinity. 328 Until the very recent back-
lash, the prevailing legislative trend with regard to divorce was
towards easier, no-fault, laws. 329 The federal government's pur-
pose in pursuing the Federal Marriage Amendment, which
would foreclose the rights of same sex couples to marry, is based
on illegitimate, invidiously discriminatory grounds that are re-
pugnant to the United States Constitution.
XI. Due Process: Classes, Fundamental Rights and
Liberty Interests
"Congress has no substantive power over sexual morality."330
Legislation that targets a class of people and that is not
"reasonably related to any proper governmental objective" im-
poses on that class "a burden that constitutes an arbitrary dep-
rivation of ... liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause [of
the Fifth Amendment] .,331 The Federal Marriage Amendment
would affect a class of people based solely on gender and sexual
orientation. It is unrelated to a "proper governmental objective"
because the only true interest served by the legislation is the
oppression of that discrete class. Oppression of a class of people
for oppression's sake is not a proper basis for legislation332 and
offends the very ideals on which this nation was founded. Even
conservatives adamantly opposed to same sex marriage agree
that marriage is a fundamental right.333 Fundamental rights
328. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-101 (2002); CAL. FAM. CODE. § 300 (Deer-
ing 2003).
329. Peter Nash Swisher, The ALI Principles: A Farewell to Fault - But What
Remedy for the Egregious Marital Misconduct of an Abusive Spouse?, 8 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 213, 213-14 (2001).
330. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 504 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
331. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
332. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
333. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). "Marriage is a fundamental
institution of our society and it should be defended against all the people who are
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confer a liberty interest and citizens cannot be deprived of them
without due process of law.334 The Federal Marriage Amend-
ment is both class-based legislation and legislation infringing
on a fundamental right. On either count, or both, the amend-
ment would deprive American citizens of their liberty and their
freedom.
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall "be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...
."335 It applies to actions taken by the federal government. The
Federal Marriage Amendment would invade the purpose of this
amendment by depriving same sex couples of liberty without
due process. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal
protection to all people under state law.33 6 The Fifth Amend-
ment doesn't contain this provision. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment "is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness"
than the Fifth Amendment. The concepts of equal protection
and due process both stem from the "American ideal of fairness"
and though the two concepts are not interchangeable, they "are
not mutually exclusive" either.337 The Court in Bolling v.
Sharpe, acknowledged that, "discrimination may be so unjustifi-
able as to be violative of due process" under the Fifth Amend-
ment. 338 The Bolling Court gave Fifth Amendment due process
that substantive equal protection flavor.
The liberty interest that is protected from government in-
terference in the absence of due process has never been abso-
lutely defined by the Supreme Court. Citizens have the right to
be free from physical restraint where they have not been af-
forded due process of law but the liberty interest protected by
the Fifth Amendment goes further than this.33 9 Liberty in-
cludes "the full range of conduct which the individual is free to
pursue"340 and this liberty "cannot be restricted except for a
attacking it. The gays have moved in to deliver the knockout punch." Nieves,
supra note 113.
334. Id.
335. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
336. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
337. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
342 [Vol. 24:301
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol24/iss1/17
SWEET LAND OF LIBERTY
proper governmental objective." 34' The Court held that the fed-
eral government could not be held to a lesser standard of due
process concerning segregation where the states were forbidden
to make laws segregating public schools.342 If the states cannot
infringe on these rights, the Court said, neither can the federal
government. 343
Marriage is a fundamental right of free men.344 The ability
to marry "has long been recognized as one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness."345 It is
"one of the 'basic civil rights of man.' ",346 Denying "this funda-
mental freedom" on an "unsupportable ... basis," such as racial
classification, violates the Fourteenth Amendment and is "sub-
versive of the principle of equality."347 In Loving v. Virginia, the
court held that "the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of
another race resides with the individual and cannot be in-
fringed by the State."348 The Court further held that the Vir-
ginia law prohibiting and criminalizing interracial marriages
deprived citizens of due process of law and equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 349 If the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses prohibit
the states from interfering with the freedom to marry, then the
Fifth Amendment's due process clause surely prevents the fed-
eral government from doing the same thing.350 As such, the fed-
eral government cannot interfere with the "fundamental
freedom" to marry where the interference is based on invidious
discrimination against a class of people.351
There is no difference between laws that prohibit marriage
based on the race of the parties and laws that prohibit marriage
based on the sex of the parties. One discriminates based on
race and the other discriminates based on sex and sexual orien-
tation. During the shameful years of American history when
341. Id. at 499-500.
342. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500.
343. Id.
344. Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 19 (Cal. 1948).
345. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954).
351. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
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black people first had no rights and then had far fewer rights
than whites, many vehement arguments were made in favor of
perpetuating the culture of slavery.352 Not surprisingly, many
of these arguments were based on a perceived Judeo-Christian
"tradition."35 3 The arguments against interracial marriage in-
clude the argument that "Almighty God created the races white,
black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate
continents."354 "The fact that he separated the races shows that
he did not intend for the races to mix." 355 The arguments
against same sex marriage include the following: that Judeo-
Christian morality condemns such practices; 356 that such con-
duct has been condemned for hundreds of years;357 and that
same sex marriage would threaten "the very basis of the whole
fabric of civilized society."358 The arguments against same sex
marriages echo those made against interracial marriages. Mar-
riage is marriage regardless of the race or gender of the parties.
In 1967, the Supreme Court decided that the states could not
352. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
The province of Maryland, in 1717, (ch. 13, s. 5,) passed a law declaring 'that
if any free negro or mulatto intermarry with any white woman, or if any
white man shall intermarry with any negro or mulatto woman, such negro
or mulatto shall become a slave during life, excepting mulattoes born of
white women, who, for such intermarriage, shall only become servants for
seven years, to be disposed of as the justices of the county court, where such
marriage so happens, shall think fit; to be applied by them towards the sup-
port of a public school within the said county. And any white man or white
woman who shall intermarry as aforesaid, with any negro or mulatto, such
white man or white woman shall become servants during the term of seven
years, and shall be disposed of by the justices as aforesaid, and be applied to
the uses aforesaid.' The other colonial law to which we refer was passed by
Massachusetts in 1705, (chap, 6.) It is entitled "An act for the better
preventing of a spurious and mixed issue," &c.; and it provides, that "if any
negro or mulatto shall presume to smite or strike any person of the English
or other Christian nation, such negro or mulatto shall be severely whipped,
at the discretion of the justices before whom the offender shall be convicted."
Id. at 408-09.
353. See discussion supra Part III.D.
354. Loving, 388 U.S. at 3.
355. Id. (quoting the trial judge who sentenced the Lovings, an interracial
couple, to jail for marrying in violation of Virginia's anti-miscegenation laws).
356. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, J., concurring).
357. Id. at 198 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
358. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, No. 2001-1647-A, 2002 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 153, at *11, 2002 WL 1299135, *4 (emphasis added) (citation omitted), va-
cated and remanded by, Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003).
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constitutionally prohibit marriage based on the race of the par-
ties.359 But, in 1996, the federal government decided that it
could refuse to recognize marriage based on the sex of the par-
ties.360 It also decided that the states could refuse to recognize
marriages solemnized in other sovereign states based on the sex
of the parties.361 If marriage is truly a fundamental right then
neither the states nor the federal government can abridge it on
the grounds of sex, race, sexual orientation, or any other invidi-
ous classification. 362 To do so violates the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment.363
If Congress were to pass the Federal Marriage Amend-
ment, it would also violate the Fifth Amendment by qualifying
the constitutional protections open to a select class of people. It
would be the kind of discrimination that is "so unjustifiable as
to be violative of due process."364
Married couples that are members of the opposite sex are
accorded certain privileges and benefits under federal law. In
fact, marriage is often a "pre-condition to the receipt of govern-
ment benefits . ,,..365 For example, spouses may transfer prop-
erty to each other without federal income tax consequences. 366
A sale or transfer of property between unmarried persons will
have transfer and income tax consequences. 367 Members of the
House of Representatives pay a portion of their salary towards
their pensions. Members of the House are entitled to health in-
surance. The spouses of those members get that insurance and
that pension on the death of the member. The same sex partner
of a representative, like Representative Studds, would receive
neither the pension, nor the health care, regardless of the fact
that the member had paid into the system the same amount as
his heterosexual colleagues, who are capable of getting married
and having such security.368 The group of people who wish to
359. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
360. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
361. Id. § 2(a).
362. See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-
500 (1954).
363. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499.
364. Id.
365. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987).
366. I.R.C. § 1041(a) (2003).
367. See id.
368. 142 CONG. REC. H7270, 7277-78 (1996).
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marry and who do marry, receive these benefits and this secur-
ity. The group that wishes to marry and is barred from mar-
rying does not.
The ability of citizens of the United States to freely "enter
into and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a
fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of
Rights."369 Marriage is one such "intimate or private" relation-
ship that is protected by the Constitution.370 In Turner v.
Safley, the Court held that, although all constitutional rights
are subject to "restrictions as a result of incarceration," prison-
ers nevertheless have the fundamental right to get married
even though they are in prison and subject to such decreased
constitutional protection.371 The court explained that prisoners
have the fundamental right to get married because marriage is
an "expression . . . of emotional support and public commit-
ment"3 72 and part of an "exercise of religious faith" or an "ex-
pression of personal dedication."373 There is no argument that
can be advanced that a marriage between two people of the
same sex is not a fundamental right as a same sex union would
also presumably be an "expression of emotional support and
public commitment," and "exercise of religious faith" or an "ex-
pression of personal dedication." If an incarcerated prisoner
still has the freedom to marry despite the fact that his convic-
tion has seriously curtailed his other constitutional rights, in-
cluding his right to liberty itself,3 74 then there is no reason that
two people of the same sex are not entitled to that same
freedom.
The federal government, bound by the Constitution, cannot
regulate marriage on the basis of sex or sexual orientation be-
cause marriage is a fundamental right of all citizens of the
United States.375 It cannot pass the Federal Marriage Amend-
ment without violating due process and equal protection. It
cannot pass the Federal Marriage Amendment without setting
369. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545
(1987).
370. Id.
371. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987).
372. Id. at 95.
373. Id. at 96.
374. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
375. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 94; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
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America back in its long search for "liberty and justice for
all."376
XII. Lawrence v. Texas
"The arc of history is long, but it bends toward justice."377
Lawrence v. Texas,378 decided by the Supreme Court on
June 26, 2003, was the Court's latest opportunity to speak to
the issue of gay civil rights. The case came up through the
Texas criminal and trial courts before it landed in the Texas
Court of Appeals. The appellants, Messrs. Lawrence and Gar-
ner, were arrested for violating section 21.06 of the Texas Penal
Code by having consensual sex with each other and they were
fined two hundred dollars each.379 They pled nolo contendere to
the criminal charges and then argued that section 21.06 of the
Texas Penal Code was unconstitutional because it violated
equal protection and a fundamental right to privacy under the
state and federal constitutions. 38 0 The Court of Appeals, asked
to answer the narrow question of whether the law making it a
criminal offense to engage in consensual homosexual sex was
facially unconstitutional, held that it was not.38 ' After analyz-
ing the text of the statute, the history of equal protection, due
process, and the realities of governance, and after rejecting ap-
pellants' arguments regarding facial invalidity, discriminatory
animus, and class based discrimination, the court finally held
"Iblecause (1) there is no fundamental right to engage in sod-
omy, (2) homosexuals do not constitute a 'suspect class,' and (3)
the prohibition of homosexual conduct advances a legitimate
state interest and is rationally related thereto, namely, preserv-
ing public morals, appellant's first contention [that the statute
violated equal protection] is overruled."38 2
376. THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE.
377. Jennie R. Shuki-Kunze, The "Defenseless" Marriage Act: The Constitu-
tionality of the Defense of Marriage Act as an Extension of Congressional Power
Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 48 CASE W. RES. 351, 351 (1998) (quoting
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.).
378. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
379. Lawrence v. Texas, 41 S.W.3d 349, 350 (Tx. App. 2001), rev'd, 123 S. Ct.
2472 (2003).
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 357.
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Appellants then made an argument that the statute imper-
missibly discriminated on the basis of gender, which the court
discounted, finding the statute to be gender neutral and to ap-
ply to two men the same as two women. The court admitted,
however, that the statute did not apply to one man and one wo-
man but did not address the anomalous result proceeding from
that admission. Regarding the appellants' right to privacy argu-
ment, the court held that there was no federal or state constitu-
tional zone of privacy that protected homosexual sex. The
Court of Appeals cited extensively to Bowers v. Hardwick
throughout the majority opinion.
The dissent agreed that there was no fundamental right to
engage in homosexual sodomy and agreed that no zone of pri-
vacy protected homosexual sex. Where the dissent disagreed
was on the equal protection claim. The dissent argued that the
statute clearly violated equal protection and that the majority
had engaged in a
Herculean effort to justify the discriminatory classification of sec-
tion 21.06 of the Penal Code despite the clear prohibitions on such
discrimination contained in the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution and the Texas Equal Rights Amend-
ment in the Bill of Rights of the Texas Constitution. 3
8 3
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.38 4
The Supreme Court overruled Bowers and held that the
statute violated the Due Process Clause. 38 5 After discussing the
questionable historical and legal evidence relied on in Bowers,
the constant criticism of the decision in the United States and
abroad, the erosion of the case's precedential value after the
Court's decisions in Casey and Romer, the rejection of the case's
reasoning by at least five states asked to answer the same ques-
tion under their state constitutions, and the lack of legal or leg-
islative reliance on the case, the Court then articulated why,
exactly, the law violated the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.38 6 The Court held:
[tihe petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The
State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by
383. Id. at 366.
384. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2476 (2003).
385. Id.
386. Id. at 2484.
[Vol. 24:301348
48http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol24/iss1/17
SWEET LAND OF LIBERTY
making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to lib-
erty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to
engage in their conduct without intervention of the government.
It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of per-
sonal liberty which the government may not enter. The Texas
statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.387
The Court carefully avoided basing its decision on the Equal
Protection Clause and explicitly stated that it did not "involve
whether the government must give formal recognition to any
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter."388 But it
did hold that, under Due Process, the right to engage in private
consensual sexual activity was a fundamental right and that
the protection of "public morals," was not a legitimate state in-
terest when it came to this right.38 9 The law did not survive
even rational basis review.
Justice O'Connor concurs in the judgment because she does
not agree with overruling Bowers and thought that the question
of whether the statute was constitutional ought to be answered,
in the negative, with reference to Equal Protection only.390 Jus-
tice O'Connor did not subscribe to the majority's view that there
is a fundamental right to privacy in consensual, intimate mat-
ters protected by Due Process. Instead she argues, not that
homosexuals were a suspect class and therefore the statute
failed under strict scrutiny, but that they were not a suspect
class and that the statute failed even under rational basis re-
view.391  Augmenting the majority's argument, Justice
O'Connor argues the only state interest offered by Texas for its
statute was moral disapproval of a group, which the court has
never held to be a legitimate state interest without more. 392
O'Connor dismisses Texas's arguments that the law applies
only to homosexual conduct, as opposed to homosexual persons,
to be specious and ultimately unpersuasive evidence of a non
discriminatory purpose. 393
387. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
388. Id.
389. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483-84.
390. Id. at 2484 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
391. Id. at 2484-85.
392. Id. at 2486.
393. Id. at 2486-87.
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In response to a five justice due process/fundamental rights
argument and a one justice equal protection argument, Justice
Scalia offers a scathing dissent accusing his brethren of capitu-
lating to the "homosexual agenda."394 In a moment of breath-
taking audacity, Justice Scalia writes that racially
discriminatory laws, which were based on nothing more than
religion and morality, are wrong, and invalid under the Consti-
tution because they intentionally discriminate on the basis of
race but laws that intentionally discriminate against homosexu-
als on the basis of orientation are valid under the Constitution
precisely because they are based on religion and morality.
3 95
"Even if the Texas law does deny equal protection to 'homosexu-
als as a class,' "he argued, "that denial still does not need to be
justified by anything more than a rational basis, which our
cases show is satisfied by the enforcement of traditional notions
of sexual morality."3 96 If morality is not a legitimate basis for
legislation, he argues, then laws against prostitution, child por-
nography, "fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestial-
ity, and obscenity" would not survive rational basis review
either.397 This argument, aside from insulting petitioners, also
misses a rather large point. The above laws are justified not by
reference solely to traditional morality but to the actual harm
done either to the victims or to society. Further, they do not
single out a class of persons in the same way that the Texas
code does. Justice Scalia addresses this argument when he says
that the law at issue impacts conduct only, in the way that laws
against public nudity impact conduct only and not nudists as a
group. This of course ignores the fact that laws against homo-
sexual sex are laws against homosexuals themselves in the
most basic sense.398
To understand why the argument that the disputed law af-
fects conduct and not classes is illogical, it might be helpful to
394. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
395. Id. at 2495-96.
396. Id. at 2496.
397. Id. at 2494-95.
398. The Texas law denied a normal life to the petitioners, (and others like
them), made them into convicted criminals and left them with a record that would
affect the rest of their lives, bar them from participation in certain aspects of civil
life, expose them to ridicule and require them, in at least four states, to register as
sex offenders. Id. at 2485-86 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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look at a hypothetical. Suppose the petitioners were heterosex-
uals instead of homosexuals. Suppose the Texas legislature had
decided to forbid heterosexual adults from having consensual
sex on pain of imprisonment because the state was offended by
it. Would this hypothetical law really just affect conduct, like
public nudity, that is not inherent in the identity of heterosexu-
als or would it instead criminalize one of the most basic aspects
and identifiers of heterosexual life? Would it target conduct or
the members of an identifiable class? Would it protect society
in the way that laws against conduct such as incest do?
Suppose sex wasn't involved at all. Suppose instead the
proposed law made it a crime to worship a particular god or vote
for particular political party. Would those laws be valid? They
affect conduct. But they also affect the essence of identity, of
autonomy as the citizens of a free nation, in the way all the
other laws Justice Scalia uses as examples do not.
Justice Scalia argues that the majority's holding that sex-
ual morality alone cannot be a legitimate state interest when
dealing with a law implicating a fundamental right is "so out of
accord with our jurisprudence-indeed, with the jurisprudence
of any society we know-that it requires little discussion. " 399
Yet, as discussed in the body of this paper, that is not true. Not
only has the Supreme Court never explicitly declared that relig-
ious morality may form the base of legislation affecting a funda-
mental right, it has explicitly held that it may not.400
Justice Scalia insists it is not the Court's decision to decide
questions better left to the legislature and the normal demo-
cratic process. But, in pointing to examples of how society cur-
rently discriminates against homosexuals to support his
argument in favor of waiting for Congress and the States to
work it out, he undermines it.
399. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The following coun-
tries recognize same sex marriage: Belgium, Denmark, Greenland, Germany,
Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal (common law). The following countries recog-
nize same sex civil unions or the like: Iceland, Finland, Columbia, France, Sweden,
and Canada. The following states or cities recognize civil unions: Vermont, USA
and Buenos Aires, Argentina Marriage Laws, at http://usmarriagelaws.com/
search/alternativejlifestyles/same sex marriage/gay-laws-aroundtheworld_/in-
dex.shtml (Dec. 31, 2002). Massachusetts is the only American state to recognize
same sex marriage to date.
400. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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Many Americans do not want persons who openly engage in ho-
mosexual conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters
for their children, as teachers in their children's schools, or as
boarders in their home. They view this as protecting themselves
and their families from a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral
and destructive. The Court views it as "discrimination" which it
is the function of our judgments to deter. So imbued is the Court
with the law profession's anti-anti-homosexual culture, that it is
seemingly unaware that the attitudes of that culture are not obvi-
ously "mainstream"; that in most States what the Court calls "dis-
crimination" against those who engage in homosexual acts is
perfectly legal; that proposals to ban such "discrimination" under
Title VII have repeatedly been rejected by Congress.401
This argument has two main problems. First, the question
presented was not whether the Constitution permits private cit-
izens to discriminate against homosexuals and incarcerate
them but whether the state can do so. Second, the judicial re-
straint he advocates is improper where the government has cre-
ated laws that violate the Constitution. If the Court had waited
for Congress and the States to dismantle American apartheid
after the civil war, perhaps it would never have ended.40 2 Yet,
Justice Scalia openly agrees that the Court's decisions were nec-
essary to end that unconstitutional oppression. He cites Lov-
ing, for example, with approval, arguing that it was well
decided and necessary because laws created solely to maintain
race supremacy are so clearly inapposite to American
jurisprudence. 40 3
Though Justice Thomas joins Justice Scalia's dissent in
name, he writes separately to say he finds the law at issue "un-
commonly silly."40 4 He opines that "punishing someone for ex-
pressing his sexual preference through noncommercial
consensual conduct with another adult does not appear to be a
worthy way to expend valuable law enforcement resources."40 5
He goes on to state that he is not, however, in a position to help
the petitioners as he is bound to decide the question with refer-
401. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
402. See generally EISENBERG, supra note 53, at 13.
403. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
404. Id. at 2498 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
405. Id.
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ence to the Constitution, which he finds does not contain any
such right to personal intimacy.40 6
Justice Scalia is right about one thing; the majority and
concurring opinions in this case will support the argument in
favor of same sex marriage. The majority opinion makes it
clear that moral disapproval alone is not a legitimate state in-
terest supporting even rational basis review of any law touching
a recognized liberty interest. It also reaffirms the notion that
there is a fundamental right to privacy in intimate relations
and decisions. Justice O'Connor's concurrence, relying prima-
rily on the majority decision in Romer, argues that statutes that
treat homosexuals differently solely on the basis of their homo-
sexuality are unconstitutional. And those are really the two
easy pieces of the argument in favor of same sex marriage and
against the Federal Marriage Amendment; 1) moral disap-
proval is an illegitimate state interest and cannot support legis-
lation targeting homosexuals; and 2) laws that treat
homosexuals differently for the bare sake of treating them dif-
ferently are unconstitutional. As discussed above, the Federal
Marriage Amendment is based on illegitimate interests: the
protection and propagation of a single view of Judeo-Christian
religious morality and discrimination for the sake of discrimina-
tion. It impacts a fundamental right. It targets a class of peo-
ple and treats them differently than identically situated
heterosexual people. As Justice Scalia so presciently asked, in
light of the case's rationale, "what justification could there pos-
sibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual
couples exercising 'the liberty protected by the Constitution?'
"407
XIII. Conclusion
"Finally, be ye all of one mind, having compassion one of an-
other .... ",408
Marriage is currently available to all heterosexual Ameri-
cans regardless of race, religion, national origin, or status of im-
prisonment.40 9 Yet, it is denied to homosexuals solely on the
406. Id.
407. Id. at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
408. 1 Peter 3:8 (King James).
409. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.
78, 96 (1987).
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basis of their sex and sexual orientation. Marriage "has long
been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."410 It should
therefore be available to all Americans regardless of sex, sexual
orientation, or other invidious classification. To confine basic
rights to favored groups is anathema to the history of the
United States and to Supreme Court precedent holding consist-
ently that this right cannot be abridged. 411 Because it is a "fun-
damental right of free men," there can be "no prohibition of
marriage except for an important social objective." 412 Prohibit-
ing an entire segment of American society from getting married
solely based on the sex of the parties does not further any objec-
tive other than discrimination. As such, marriage cannot be
prohibited to homosexuals and the Federal Marriage Amend-
ment is therefore illegitimate.
After Lawrence was decided, all hell broke loose in the me-
dia as pundits and commentators around the world weighed in.
Even the Vatican issued a statement calling on democratically
elected Catholic lawmakers to vote against any extension of the
rights of marriage to homosexuals on the basis of faith and Vat-
ican commands.413 Since Lawrence, many Americans have ar-
gued that homosexuals do not deserve the same rights or the
same treatment as their heterosexual counterparts and that the
extension of marriage rights to them must be prevented at all
costs. 414 Some commentators think those arguments sound fa-
miliar and note,
"how closely the resistance to same-sex marriage resembles white
people's fears about interracial marriage, which were at the emo-
tional core of their fears about integration in general." Now, as in
the 1950's and 60's, much of the objection to legally extending
marital rights takes the form of religious warnings about a declin-
ing 'moral order,' even though the rights being debated are those
410. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
411. See id.
412. Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 19 (Cal. 1948) (overturning anti-miscegena-
tion law as violating equal protection).
413. Alan Cooperman & David Von Drehle, Vatican Instructs Legislators On
Gays; Backing Marriages Called Immoral, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2003, at Al.
414. Evelyn Nieves, Family Values Groups Gear Up For Battle Over Gay Mar-
riage, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2003, at A6; Alison Gendar, 52% Want A Ban On Gay
Marriage, DAiLY NEWS, Aug. 9, 2003, at 6; Bauer, supra note 114; Bennett, supra
note 112.
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granted by the government, not those bestowed (or withheld) by
religious denominations. 415
This country must not continue as a "house divided against
itself ' 416 reserving fundamental rights to favored groups and
perpetually creating second-class citizens. Those who oppose
gay civil rights have the right to their beliefs, but they have no
right to impose religious domestic policy on a secular nation.
They have no right to use the might of the many to remove the
humanity of the few. Granting same sex couples equal rights
harms no one but failing to grant those rights harms everyone.
In America, all people "are created equal."417 Among such
equals, no person, or group of people, should be more equal
than another, enjoying rights, like marriage, not available to
all. Our society espouses the belief that America truly is the
"land of the free."418 To live up to that image we must extend
basic and fundamental rights to all people regardless of sex,
race, color, creed, national origin, and sexual orientation.419
Otherwise, we turn our back on the American dream of a free
land.
Said Supreme Court Justice Matthews in 1886, "[t]he very
idea that one man may be compelled to hold ... any material
right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of an-
other, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom
prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself."420 Oppression of
homosexuals by singling them out for unfavorable treatment is
as much "moral slavery" as oppression of blacks and women and
must be as roundly condemned. Only by refusing the tempta-
tion presented by the Federal Marriage Amendment, to make
new outsiders, do we truly preserve traditional American
values.
415. Frank Rich, And Now the Queer Eye for Straight Marriage, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 2003, at B1.
416. President Abraham Lincoln, Address to the Illinois Republican State
Convention (June 16, 1858).
417. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
418. Francis Scott Key, The Star-Spangled Banner (1814). America is re-
ferred to as this "sweet land of liberty." Patriots are exhorted to "let freedom ring."
In our Pledge of Allegiance it is said that American is "one Nation ... with liberty
and justice for all." THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE.
419. RICHARDs, supra note 70, at 3-4.
420. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
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